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A rede como solução anti-DDoS

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DDoS attacks on public services are impacting and mediatic



The screenshot shows the ABC News website header with navigation links for VIDEO, LIVE, SHOWS, and CLIMATE. The main headline reads "Worst cyberattack in Greece disrupts high school exams, causes political spat". Below the headline is a sub-headline: "Greece's Education Ministry says it has been targeted in a cyberattack described as the most extensive in the country's history, aimed at disabling a centralized high school examination platform". The byline states "By The Associated Press" and the date "May 30, 2023, 9:25 AM". Social media sharing icons for Facebook, Twitter, Email, and a link icon are visible at the bottom right of the article preview.


[Worst cyberattack in Greece disrupts high school exams, causes political spat | AP News](#)

It said the distributed denial of service, or DDoS, attacks aimed at overwhelming the platform occurred for a second consecutive day Tuesday. The attack involved **computers from 114 countries**, causing outages and delays in high school exams but failing to incapacitate the system, the ministry said.

Botnets became a dominant threat

Botnet DDoS

became dominant form of attack in first quarter 2022



DVR x.7.5.9 is a DDoS botnet member




Parking meter

x.3.17.23 is a DDoS botnet member


Rise of Botnets

Increasingly competitive booter market and cheap IoT botnets

Average Price for Buying DDoS Attacks



Collapse in daily average US price for launching a 100 Gbps DDoS using illegal booter web sites 2018 - 2022




er.net



ab.sx

Allowing the proliferation of DDoS attacks

Botnet attack against EU customer




The technical challenge with botnet DDoS

Traditional payload pattern detection techniques are no longer useful

Traditional DDoS (1990 – 2021)

- Spoofed IP addresses to trigger reflected amplified responses
- Or floods of crafted packets
- Often from well-known domains

From threshold-based
detection...



Botnet-based DDoS

- Real devices, real IP-addresses and full TCP stack
- Appears as “regular” HTTP(s) bypass typical scrubbing payload ML
- Growing armies of devices connected anywhere

...to big-data
knowledge-based detection

A new DDoS protection paradigm is needed

1 Surgical Detection based on big-data principles

From threshold-based...

...to **knowledge-based** detection

2 Leverage advances in IP Silicon to filter DDoS attacks


From expensive/limited scale DPI scrubbing...

...to scalable line-rate scrubbing on **IP silicon**

...with anti-DDoS at the Peering routers

Requires from the IP silicon:

- 1 **Telemetry performance**
 - sampling rate OR mirroring
- 2 **Packet filtering scale**
- 3 **Packet filtering performance**
 - line rate (!)



... the network is able to natively* classify DDoS traffic

Time	TTL	Proto	TCP Flag	Peer	Src IP	SPort	Dst IP	DPort	Drop	Src Genome	Bytes	Len
13:45:00	60	17			131.99.238	22897	.152.18	7778	44	lighttpd webcam k.jp ddoobot	536094310	1,428
13:45:00	58	17			56.86.130	61792	.152.18	7778	44	commax webcam ulwsd ddoobot	536094310	1,428
13:30:00	60	17			66.250.12828157		.152.18	7778	16	ddoobot	534757427	1,427
13:45:00	61	17			84.1.105	5306	.152.18	7778	16	unknown_web fujitsu.com ddosamp rfpj ddoobot	534757427	1,427
13:45:00	61	17			59.11.196	48338	.152.18	7778	16	nit.com ddoobot	534757427	1,427
13:45:00	60	17			11.137.76	41311	.152.18	7778	44	commax webcam ulwsd specc zon.net com ddoobot	534024294	1,428
13:50:00	55	17			.157.33	27181	.152.18	7778	16	app-webs httpd webcam ie.com unknown_dns hivision myfritz ddoobot	533827788	1,427
13:55:00	62	17			2.99.28	2823	.152.18	7778	44	ddoobot	533722419	1,428


Advanced detection logic Combining:

- o Genome info on src&dst IPs
- o traffic rates and traffic patterns
- o traffic 'invariants'
- o Source-IP cardinality
- o Info on Internet topology (TTL, peering/transit networks)

(*): Native detection = no need to configure traffic thresholds for each type of potentially malicious traffic

... and then compile the most efficient filter list...

Genome, AI/ML, Compiler and high-performance IP silicon as protection enablers



Defense policy compiler




All data processing / filtering on-premise

```
entry 8 create
  description ";;DFA;acl_90"
  match protocol 17
    dst-ip ip-prefix-list "VLAB_7_1"
    packet-length lt 40
    fragment false
  exit
  action
  drop
  exit
exit
entry 9 create
  description ";;DFA;acl_571"
  match protocol 6
    dst-ip ip-prefix-list "VLAB_7_1"
    tcp-fin true
    tcp-syn true
  exit
  action
  drop
  exit
exit
entry 10 create
  description ";;DFA;acl_579"
  match protocol 6
    src-ip ip-prefix-list "VLAB_9_518"
  exit
  action
  drop
  exit
exit
entry 4 create
  description ";;DFA;acl_13498"
  match
    dst-ip ip-prefix-list "VLAB_9_495"
    ttl range 1 37
  exit
  action
  drop
  exit
exit
```



Linear filtering capacity at the peering router

Performance with scale



Large filter scale (256k filter entries) for increased filter granularity



Minimize false positives

Perform ACL packet match in a single pass regardless of the number of ACL entries or ordering



Fast attack mitigation

Router capacity is maintained, which cannot be guaranteed for implementations that parse through each entry sequentially



Deterministic **linerate protection**

... with minimal false positive rate

Summary

1,057
FILTERS ✓

0%
FALSE POSITIVE BYTES ✓

Plan

Search:

Order	Counter Measure	Num Filters	% Bytes	% Packets
10	drop_udp_avg_pktlen_invariant (gid 44)	1	91	83
20	drop_bot (gid 16)	1,057	9	8

Showing 1 to 2 of 2 entries

Previous 1 Next

Take aways

Knowledge

The network as
source of
traffic big-data

AI/ML

Compile efficient
filters to minimize
false positives

Network Performance

Deterministic and
high-performance
filters capacity at the
Peering routers

More information here

DDoS security | Nokia

NOKIA

DDoS security

Everything you need to know about Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)

What is DDoS?

Distributed Denial of Service or DDoS is malicious traffic that aims to deny access or degrade or stop connectivity for individual users, internet hosts and service provider network infrastructure.

Malicious players have been exploiting IP protocol and systems vulnerabilities for more than a couple of decades now to launch DDoS attacks on their targets: network hosts and systems. Some protocols, such as BGP and Domain Name System (DNS), have gained additional security features to make them more robust. Also, industry-wide initiatives using best practices have been implemented to curb DDoS traffic (BPM-23). However, many hosts still use protocols that rely on open principles set by the internet community a long time ago. Some of them never envisaged malicious exploits that could jeopardize the intended operation of router-based networks.

What are the different types of DDoS?

Broadly, all DDoS traffic can be categorized into:

- Amplification and reflection DDoS
- Flooding DDoS traffic (using IP address spoofing or IP header modification, IPHM)
- Application DDoS.

Please check out our application note, DDoS Protection for the cloud, 5G and IoT era.

On this page

- ↓ [What is DDoS?](#)
- ↓ [What are the different types of DDoS?](#)
- ↓ [How large is DDoS \(danger\)?](#)
- ↓ [What is the impact on service provider networks?](#)
- ↓ [Botnet DDoS](#)
- ↓ [Why is a new approach to DDoS security needed?](#)
- ↓ [Related products and solutions](#)
- ↓ [Learn more](#)

Community

Global DDoS Threat Alliance →

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